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1 Introduction
The modern theory of investment accepts that the investment decision is
a¤ected a future that is unknown and therefore uncertain. Dixit and Pindy-
ck’s (1994) treatment of the irreversibility of investment, systematically in-
troduces the importance of uncertainty to the investment decision.
A number of papers have testedthe Dixit-Pindyck framework using South
African longitudinal data as basis. Fielding (1997), using an aggregate in-
vestment analysis, emphasises that investment has irreversibility and asym-
metrical adjustment costs associated with it. Fedderke (2001, 2004) using
panel analysis of manufacturing sectors …nds that uncertainty is a signi…-
cant determinant in the investment function. Mariotti (2002) and Kularatne
(2002) also …nd direct support that uncertainty is a factor in investment
using aggregate data in multiple equation growth models for South Africa.
All of these studies have in common the feature that uncertainty is mea-
sured by reference to political instability, though the measures employed are
not identical across all the cited studies.
This paperexamines thepossibility thatpolitical instability may notbe as
unsystematic as the interpretation of its impact as uncertainty would imply.
While political instability may render future investment returns uncertain,
the intensity of political instability may potentially be systematically related
to underlying institutional, social and political determinants.
Three core theoretical propositions are considered in developing an un-
derstanding of political instability in South Africa. Modernization theory
attributes political instability to the disruption of traditional institutional
structures due to economic development. An alternative attributes the pri-
mary driver of political instability to political aspirations that arise from op-
position to what is perceived to be an “unjust” political dispensation. The
…nal explanatory framework attributes primacy to the evolution of property
rights and the broader institutional framework associated with the prop-
erty rights. Political instability arises under conditions where poorly de…ned
property rights provide perverse incentives to economic agents.
The core …nding of the paper is that political instability may indeed
be said to be systematically related to the development of property rights,
to crime, as well as to an indicator of real economic development. The
only framework that does not receive support as a determinant of political
instability on this evidence is that whichattributes primacy topolitical rights
and aspirations.The Political Economy of Institutions 2
On this understanding the understanding of uncertainty and its relevance
to investment has been modi…ed. Political instability is no longer exogenous,
but subject to endogenous structural determination. Uncertainty does not
dissipate - but attaches to a constellation of institutions.
Section 2 of the paper brie‡y outlines the theory of irreversible invest-
ment. The empirical model examined in the paper is developed in section 3.
The characteristics of the data are explored in section 4. Estimation results
are presented in section 5, and section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical background
Economic theory grounds the analysis of investment in the optimizing be-
haviour of …rms. In early theoretical work1 the assumption was that …rms
instantaneouslyandcostlessly adjust capital stock, withthe consequencethat
the optimization problem of the …rm becomes essentially static rather than
dynamic. In particular, optimization requires that the marginal product of
capital be equated to its user cost at all time points. The consequence was
that the dynamic adjustment path which provides the investment ‡ow could
only be realized as an ad hoc extension not behaviourally grounded.2
The reason for this limitation attaches to the assumption of an absence
of adjustment costs in capital stock. Two resolutions to these limitations
have emerged in the literature. Both introduce friction into the investment
relationship, though they di¤er as to the source of such friction. In the
…rst extension, the assumption of zero adjustment costs in capital stock is
abandoned. The second extension attributes friction in investment to the
irreversibility of the investment decision.3
In the classic contribution of Eisner and Strotz (1963) the optimization
problem of the …rm focuses directly on the alteration of the …rm’s plant
size, and is concerned to maximize net pro…t subject to adjustment costs
associated with changing the …xed capital stock. The key lies in the convex-
ity of adjustment costs. An adjustment path of capital stock from existing
to intertemporal equilibrium that is explicitly grounded in optimizing …rm
1Perhaps most closely associated with the work of Jorgenson - see for instance Jorgen-
son (1963). The discussion in Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Ferderer (1993) is also
instructive.
2See the discussion in Abel and Blanchard (1988:249), and Sensenbrenner (1991:819).
3Note that in Abel and Eberly (1994) both of these alternatives are combined in a
general model.The Political Economy of Institutions 3
behaviour is now derivable. Tobin’s q-theory of investment4 represents one
possible operationalization of these principles.
However, what is absent from the investment model incorporating adjust-
ment costs in capital stock is any indicationthat optimization over anin…nite
time horizon introduces uncertainty. It is this possibility that is identi…ed by
introducing the irreversibility of investment - and it is on this approach that
the present paper will focus.
The possibility that investment is irreversible in the sense that resale of
capital goods is not possible except at some discount relative to their pur-
chase price less depreciation, introduces a second friction into the investment
relation.5
Since the irreversibility friction prevents the …rm from divesting itself
of capital stock in the face of a negative demand shock, uncertainty over
future demand assumes greater signi…cance under this class of model than in
alternative approaches to optimal investment expenditure.6 In particular, it
means that it may pay to wait before investing, since irreversibility attaches
an opportunity cost to undertaking the investment expenditure now rather
than in the future.
Let the …rm’s production function be f(K) and let the …rm’s uncertain
demand be given by P = CD(f(K)), where P is price, C is a shift parameter
subject to Brownian motion.7 The pro…t ‡ow of the …rm is given by ¼: Let:
dC = ®Cdt+ ¾Cdz (1)
then
¼ = C:D(f (K))f (K) = C:R(K) (2)
4See Tobin (1969), Tobin and Brainard (1968) and (1977) - and see also the discussion
in Abel (1983), Hayashi (1982), Mussa (1977), and Sensenbrenner (1991).
5Irreversibility of investment is really just another form of (in…nite) adjustment cost.
Treatment of investment under irreversibility also has a long history in the literature - see
for instance Aiginger (1987), Arrow (1968), Bernanke (1983), Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
McDonald and Siegel (1986), Nickell (1978), and Pindyck (1988) and (1991).
6In the absence of the irreversibility friction, negative demand shocks in the …rm’s
industry, can be countered by divesting the capital stock at fair market prices to …rms in
sectors not subject to the shock.
7Brownian motion here introduces uncertainty, such that
BM = dx = axdt+ ¾xdz
dz = "
p
dtfor "t » N(0;1)such that E(¢z) = ®¢t and V ar(¢z) = ¾2dt: Both terms
capture uncertainty, with axdt a trend term and ¾xdz volatility surrounding the trend.The Political Economy of Institutions 4
where R(K) is the revenue function in capital.8 The …rm must now
decide to invest or not to invest, in order to maximise the present value of
the expected pro…t.


























¾2 > 1 (5)
Investment will occur only if the expected marginal pro…t from capital,
C(k):R"(K)=±K; is greater thanthe cost of installation of the additional unit
of capital by ¯=(¯ ¡ 1) > 1. This investment boundary is dependent on the
discount rate (½), the trend parameter (®) and its associated volatility (¾).
Anincrease inany of these variables will lead to adecreasein¯1,9 whichleads
to an increase in the option value through ¯=(¯ ¡ 1), raising the investment
boundary. Note that even though ¾ is increasing the boundary, increased
volatility may allow the boundary to be hit more often than in a situation
with lower volatility, leaving the sign of the impact of uncertainty ambiguous
a priori.
It is therefore unclear if there will be increased or decreased investment
in the presence of increasing uncertainty.
3 An extended investment model for South Africa
The crucial question that arises from the theoretical framework presented in
section 2 concerns how uncertainty is to be operationalized in any empirical
application.







@½ < 0The Political Economy of Institutions 5
Recently a number of papers have examined investment models for South
Africa. Table 1 reports the signs foundfor variables included in these studies.
All the studies reported here have incorporated variables interpreted within
the studies as measures of uncertainty.
The …rst point to note concerning the reported …ndings is that despite
the variety of estimation approaches adopted by the studies, and the vari-
ety of speci…cations employed, the …nding of a negative impact on the vari-
ables interpreted as uncertainty measures is pervasive. The second point to
note is that many of the studies under consideration have employed political
uncertainty as one, in many instances even as the primary, measure of un-
certainty. The primary contender as an alternative uncertainty measure is
demand volatility.
The use of political instability as a measure of uncertainty raises an im-
portant conceptual question.
If political instability is indeed to be understood as uncertainty in a prox-
imate sense, the presumption must be that it is in some fundamental sense
unsusceptible to systematicexplanation. Yet such a presumption would seem
to stretch credibility - especially in the South African context which has seen
considerable energy devoted not only to the analysis of social and political
transitions, but also to the relation between political change and economic
growth.
At least three distinct positions are identi…able in the literature, which
either explicitly or implicitly link political instability to underlying structural
factors that come to determine it. We note immediately that these are ideal-
izations of the approaches that have been adopted by various authors - many
of whom show elements of all three of the identi…ed mechanisms leading to
political instability.10
The modernization hypothesis of Lipset (1959) posits the evolution of
political institutions, and democracy in particular, as a consequence of eco-
nomic development.11 The implication is that economic growth, and the
evolution of per capita GDP is not only the source of political development,
but as a necessary corollary it will entail signi…cant disruption of established
political order in the process of realising the change. One author states the
link as follows:
10In the South African instance, see for instance Wood (2000).
11For a fuller exploration of the theoretical underpinnings of this view and related em-
pirical evidence, see Diamond (1992), and the wider comparative discussion in Fedderke
(1997).The Political Economy of Institutions 6
Social and economic change extend political consciousness, mul-
tiply political demands, broaden political participation. These
changes undermine traditional sources of political authority and
traditional political institutions The result is political instability
and disorder. The primary problem of politics is a lag in the
development of political institutions behind social and economic
change (Huntington, 1968:5).
On this view therefore, economic development can be identi…ed as a (if
not the) source of political instability.12
An alternative view attributes primacy to the political. Political insta-
bility on this view is attributable to frustrated political aspiration. The
core mechanism underlying political instability on this view is a failure of a
political order to gain acceptance due to a rupture in the consistency and
coherence of the principles on which it is based. This results in an inability of
the political system to represent adequately the values and identity of those
whom it serves, …nally leading to change in more or less violent form.13 This
has been formulated as:
the realization of freedom presupposes a history, and one full of
struggle and con‡ict. And we can consider it providential that
men are not inclined by nature to harmony, but are marked by
antagonism, by ‘unsocial sociability.’ For this is what goads them
ever onward towards the only stable solution possible for hu-
man society, a law-governed social order. Meanwhile, as we look
over the span of centuries, we can see men driven ever by their
own con‡icts and tensions towards their own destinies. (Taylor,
1985:336)
12In traditional South African growth debates, this view underpins the interpretation
of the South African growth path that is present in the contributions of O’Dowd (1974,
1978), and Bromberger (1974, 1978), for instance. Presentation of international evidence
is myriad with both a¢rmative (see for instance Muller (1997)) and more sceptical views
present in the literature (see for instance Huntington (1984), though the scepticism is
revised somewhat in (1991)).
13The quintessential example of such change is perhaps the American war of indepen-
dence. Economic interests were if anything harmed by severing colonial ties, yet the
principle of “no taxation without representation” identi…ed a con‡ict of principles deemed
(on this interpretation) su¢ciently fundamental by American citizens to merit war. In
the South African debate this position has been consistently argued as a (perhaps the)
fundamental force for political change by De Kadt (2001).The Political Economy of Institutions 7
The fundamental point for our purposes here is that the impetus to po-
litical change and instability is political - not economic. Such a conception is
consistent with the imperatives that underlie debates around justice and its
consequences for the shape of human society,14 as well as recent conceptions
of what it means to undergo economic development in a fuller sense.15
A thirdin‡uential contribution has identi…ed amore concrete set of mech-
anisms that underlie instability. In the understanding of institutions pio-
neered by North (1990), they are viewed as rules of the game governing
societal interactions. It follows that institutions can explain not only a sig-
ni…cant component of economic activity, but that since they constitute the
rules of interaction between agents, they may themselves come to explain
either well-functioning or dysfunctional social systems and their evolution
over time.16 The presence of a set of rules of the game provided by institu-
tions, still leaves considerable scope for strategic interaction between agents,
and leaves considerable scope for change over time through unintended con-
sequences of strategic interaction. North himself observes:
Long-run economic change is the cumulative consequence of in-
numerable short-run decisions by political and economic entre-
preneurs that both directly and indirectly (via external e¤ects)
shape performance. The choices made re‡ect the entrepreneurs’
subjective modeling of the environment. Because the models re-
‡ect ideas, ideologies, and beliefs.... the consequences of speci…c
policies are not only uncertain but to a substantial degree un-
predictable...... However, the increasing-returns characteristics of
the institutional matrix and the complementary subjective mod-
els of the players suggest that although the speci…c short-run
paths are unforeseeable, the overall direction in the long run is
both more predictable and more di¢cult to reverse (North, 1990:
104 - emphasis added).
Good institutions are those that provide predictability and incentives
14The contributions here are too numerous to mention, and the present discussion is not
aimed at an exploration of alternative conceptions of justice and their welfare implications.
But certainly the work of Rawls (1971) and his respondents has had a substantial impact
on conceptions of welfare in economics.
15See for example the discussion of development as freedom, in Sen (1999).
16See Luiz (2005), Engerman and Sokolo¤ (2003), Fedderke (2004) and the seminal work
by North (1990).The Political Economy of Institutions 8
for growth-enhancing activities by inducing productive behaviour from eco-
nomic players. In economic terms good institutions are characterised by the
enforcement of property rights so that individuals have incentives to invest
and partake in economic activities; constrains on the actions of elites, politi-
cians, andother powerful groups, inorder toprevent expropriation; and some
degree of equal opportunity which enables agents to participate in economic
activity.17 By inference, poor institutions, rather than generating a stable
predictable environment, may be the source of con‡ict and unpredictability
of the economic environment.
The nature of the property rights in a country is likely to a¤ect politi-
cal instability through various channels. Insecure property rights result in
challenges to property ‘ownership’ with no legitimate mechanisms to resolve
these which make violence a viable, and often successful, option. In theory,
secure property rights should lower instability because it is up to the legal
framework to resolve disputes and the incentive to engage in acts of violence
are thereby rendered redundant. However, where the property rights regime
is such that it entrenches old orders and high levels of inequality then in fact
there are perversely high incentives for agents to undermine the status quo
through any means. Property rights are therefore most e¤ective in lowering
instability when they are not only well de…ned but also widely dispersed so
that most have an interest in supporting them and have something to lose
through an unstable environment.
In the South African context the hypothesis would be that the apartheid
dispensation in South Africa was an example of a dysfunctional institution
system that triggered distributional con‡ict. The inequitable distribution of
property rights led to a situation where di¤erent racial and ethnic groups
were pitted against each other in con‡ict. Marginalised groups (blacks under
apartheid), who were prevented from participating fully in economic activity
and were prohibited from property ownership in large areas of the country,
had little incentive to engage in productive activities and had high incentives
to undermine the racist institutional framework. The consequence was in-
creased instability and hence rising uncertainty in the institutional structure
itself.
Whilst we know that enforceable property rights are a necessary but in-
su¢cient condition for economic growth,18 the nature of the property rights
17See for instance the discussion in Acemoglu (2003:27).
18See Acemoglu (2003), Luiz (2005), North (1990), and Fedderke (2004).The Political Economy of Institutions 9
in South Africa were such that there was a likely impact on the levels of
crime in the economy.19 In the context of this paper, crime in South Africa
was associated with both ‘normal’ criminal activities as well as those induced
by the institutional framework of racial estates. The exclusionary nature of
property rights meant that there was no incentive to respect the institutions
which govern property and indeed there were real incentives to undermine
them with the resulting rises in criminal activity. There may also be an
indirect impact of crime. If agents had become accustomed to violating
apartheid laws, this may have had spill over e¤ects into other forms of crime
which further raises instability and uncertainty.
The model which follows controls both for the framework of rules in the
economy (political and property rights) as well as the level of enforcement of
the rules (a crime variable).
Investment theory now leaves us with mapping from expected future re-
turns to investment, the user cost of capital, uncertainty and potentially
property rights into investment rates. In South African investment functions
political instability has become the standard measure of uncertainty. The
preceding discussion now suggests the endogenization of political instability.
The three alternative views on the source of political instability suggest a
mapping from either output (GDP), political rights, or property rights into
political instability respectively.
A strong test of the three accounts of institutional instability might test
the two equation system given by rows (1) and (2) of Table 2, as appropriate.
We have already noted that the three conceptions advanced as sources
of political instability need not be mutually exclusive. It is conceivable that
economic development, political aspirations, as well as strategic interaction
within the rules of the game provided by property rights all play a role in
stimulating political instability. Indeed, as we havenoted in the work of most
authors (includingthose citedinsupport of the various ideal cases above) this
is generally the case. A more sophisticated understanding of the three mech-
anisms might therefore insist on a weak test, based on the estimation of the
two equation system given by rows (1) and (3) of Table 2. The weak version
of the three theories would in each instance accord weak exogeneity status to
theprimary driver identi…ed. Thus the weak modernization viewmight allow
an impact of political and property rights, but accord temporal primacy to
19See for example, Luiz (2001) who explores the dynamics of crime in South Africa and
its relationship with economic variables.The Political Economy of Institutions 10
GDP in setting it weakly exogenous in estimation. Symmetrically, primacy
of political aspirations would set political rights weakly exogenous, while pri-
macy of property rights would accord weak exogeneity to the property rights
measure.
What is clear is that on any of these alternative conceptions of the source
of political instability, the understanding of uncertainty and its relevance to
investment has been transformed. Political instability on all three concep-
tions is no longer exogenous, but subject to endogenous structural determi-
nation.
It does not follow that uncertainty has been dissipated. Instead, uncer-
tainty can be viewed as attaching to the constellation of institutions that
together come to generate political instability20 - as well as the consequences
of such instability when it emerges, since the consequences of a predictable
event need not themselves be predictable in their own right.
4 The Data
The South African case a¤ords a unique opportunity to investigate the sys-
tem of equations given in Table 2. Measures of the institutional dimensions
required for the system of equations have been reported in a prior study21
- and to the best of our knowledge are not available for other economies.
This provides us with a data sample covering the period from 1954 to 1992.
Sample size is restricted by data availability. For estimation purposes sample
size is restrictive, a¤ecting the power of the statistical tests reported. De-
tails of the variables employed in the study and their sources are reported in
Appendix A.
Table 3 reports Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for stationarity. For all
variables of the study the …nding is of …rst di¤erence stationarity.
20Note that this accords well with the …nding in Fedderke and Kltigaard (1998) that
social, institutional and politicalvariables hang together by means of “webs of association.”
21See Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001a).The Political Economy of Institutions 11
5 Empirical Methodology and Estimation Results
In estimation we employ the VECM methodology. The methodology is now
standard, so that exposition can be brief.22
Consider the general VAR (Vector Autoregressive Estimation) speci…ca-
tion given by:
zt = Amzt¡1 + ::: +Amzt¡m + ± +Àt (6)
where zt is a n£1 matrix, m is the lag length, ± deterministic terms andÀt





¡i¢zt¡i + ¦zt¡k+1 + ± + Àt (7)
where ¦ = ®¯
0
. We refer to ® as the loading matrix, containing the
short-run dynamics, while ¯ is the matrix containing the long run equilib-
rium (cointegrating) relationships. The rank, r, of the matrix represents the
number of cointegrating vectors and is tested for using the standard Trace
and Maximal Eigenvalue test statistics. Where r > 1 issues of identi…cation
arise.23 Just identi…cation can proceed by means of restrictions on ¡, ®, or
¯ space.24
6 Parameterisation
A number of variables are standard to investment functions. The core of
all investment functions is an attempt to identify net rates of return to in-
vestment - with output frequently serving as an indicator of expected future
returns to investment, while the user cost of capital serves as a measure of
the marginal cost of investment. Finally, both a proxy for uncertainty and
potentially property rights are identi…ed as relevant to investment decisions.
These considerations suggest the empirical investment model represented as:
It = b0 + b1lnY
e
t ¡ b2uct +b3INSTt +b4PROPt (8)
22See the more detailed discussion in Johansen (1988), Johansen and Juselius (1990,
1991, 1992).
23See Wickens (1996), Johansen and Juselius (1990, 1992), Pesaran and Shin (1995a,
1995b), Pesaran, Shin and Smith (1996).
24See Greenslade et al, 1999:3¤.The Political Economy of Institutions 12
where It denotes the investment rate as measured by INVRAT, Y e
t is ex-
pected output, uct is the user cost of capital,25 political instability is denoted
INSTt PROPt denotes property rights and CRt a measure of crime. The-
oretical priors suggest b1;b2;b4 > 0, while previous empirical work on South
Africa predicts b3 < 0.
The preceding discussion also suggests the endogenization of political
instability. The three alternative conceptions of the source of instability
might suggest straightforwardly:
INSTt = d0 +d1Xt (9)
where Xt denotes either Yt (modernization), POLt as a measure of politi-
cal rights (political aspiration), or PROPt (North’s property rights), in three
alternative formulations of the core propositions advanced in explanation of
political instability. A strong test of the three accounts of institutional in-
stability might test the two equation system given by (8) and (9), in which
the favoured regressor has been loaded.
We have already noted that the three conceptions advanced as sources
of political instability need not be mutually exclusive. It is conceivable that
economic development, political aspirations, as well as strategic interaction
within the rules of the game provided by property rights all play a role in
stimulating political instability. Indeed, as we havenoted in the work of most
authors (including those cited in support of the various ideal cases above)
this is generally the case. A more sophisticated understanding of the three
mechanisms might therefore insist on a weak test. Here estimation of:
INSTt = h0+ h1lnY
e
t +h2POLt + h3PROPt + h4CRt (10)
would allow for a test of weak exogeneity of the mechanism which is ac-
corded primacy in the three alternative views. CRt denotes the crime rate
variable measured by CRIMPOP. Thus the weak modernization view might
allowan impactof political andproperty rights, but accordtemporal primacy
to GDP in setting it weakly exogenous to the VECM in estimation. Sym-
metrically, primacy of political aspirations would set political rights weakly
exogenous, while primacy of property rights would accord weak exogeneity
to the property rights measure. Inclusion of the crime rate is on the basis of
the discussion of section 2 above.
25The user cost of capital is introduced into the model in order to assess the marginal
cost of capital.The Political Economy of Institutions 13
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where It represents the investment rate givenby INV RAT;Yt represents real
GDP measured by LNRGDP; UCt represents the user cost of capital as mea-
sured by USER;Pt represents political instability as measured by INSTAB;
CRt represents the crime rate as measured by CRIMPOP; PRt represents
property rights as measured by PROPRIGHT; and POLt represents political
rights as measured by POLRIGHT.
The strong tests of the three conceptions of the source of political in-
stability captured by equation (11) are given by the three sets of over-
identifying restrictions given by ¯24 = ¯25 = ¯26 = ¯27 = 0 (modernization);
¯22 = ¯24 = ¯25 = ¯26 = 0 (political primacy); ¯22 = ¯24 = ¯25 = ¯26 = 0
(institutions; property rights).
The weak tests ofthe threeconceptionsof the source ofpolitical instability
captured by equation (5.5) are given by the three sets of over-identifying
restrictions given by ¯25 = ®21 = ®22 = 0 (modernization); ¯25 = ®71 =
®72 = 0 (political primacy); ¯25 = ®61 = ®62 = 0 (institutions; property
rights).
7 Estimation Results
We estimate by the Johansen VECM technique. Associated maximal eigen-
value and trace statistics are reported in Table 4.
Both tests reveal the presence of at least two cointegrating vectors - and
in the case of the trace statistic of up to …ve CV’s. While generally the
trace statistic might be given preference on the grounds of its better power
characteristics in small samples, we proceed on the assumption of two CV’s,
for three reasons. First, the eigenvalue statistic gives unambiguous support
to the presence of twin vectors. Second, given that a number of variables in-
cluded in the study are likely partially integrated (particularly CRIMPOP),
the test statistics may well overstate the number of cointegrating linear com-
binations of variables. Given the absence of prior theoretical guidance onThe Political Economy of Institutions 14
a just identifying structure to be imposed on the cointegrating space, we
therefore proceed on the assumption of two vectors.
Estimation proceeds under (5.4), with associated over-identifying restric-
tions given by the strong and weak test versions of the hypothesized mecha-
nisms governing political instability.
Results from estimation under the strong test are reported in Table 5.
Columns (1) through (3) report VECM estimation results for the modern-
ization, political primacy, and institutions/property rights formulations re-
spectively. Columns (1a) through (3a) reported the associated elasticities
computed at mean values of relevant variables.
All variables in the estimated investment relationships report coe¢cients
that accord with prior sign expectations; output and property rights are pos-
itive, and report economically strong impacts on investment rates; political
instability and the use cost of capital have negative coe¢cients and have a
somewhat more muted economic impact. For the investment relation, all
three models con…rm error correction at least in the cointegrating vector
associated with investment expenditure.
A disconcerting feature of the results is the very strong output elasticities
reported for the investment relation. Even granting the estimation in stock-
‡ow format, in all three estimated models the output elasticity is strong -
but this proves particularly marked for the speci…cation testing for political
primacy of political instability. Indeed, the political primacy formulation
generally reports considerably stronger elasticities than the alternative mod-
els.
Additional di¢culties emerge from a consideration of the second coin-
tegrating vector in all three models estimated. Both the political and the
property rights variables reportthe anticipatedsign- withrisingrights associ-
atedwith decreasing levels of political instability. However, while the implied
meanelasticity associated with political rights is perhaps plausible (0.4), that
associated with property rights is too dramatic (66.58) to be credible. The
modernization process receives support provided one provides a “pressure
cooker” interpretation - with rising output generating increased instability
under a repressive system (political rights are of course not controlled for in
this long run formulation). Finally, for all three models, but particularly for
the political primacy speci…cation, the error correction process is weak at
best, and potentially absent.
Whilethereisthus someevidenceconsistentwitheach of the hypothesized
structural determinations of political instability, the evidence for all in theThe Political Economy of Institutions 15
strong sense of providing an exclusive explanation of instability, is weak at
best. Parameter instability, implausibly large elasticities, and poor error
correction behaviour is suggestive of an underspeci…ed set of estimations.
The logical extension in estimation is the formulation of the weak tests
discussed in the preceding sub-section. Here all three determinants are al-
lowed to drive political instability - but primacy is accorded to one explana-
tion by assigning weak exogeneity status tothe relevant explanatory variable,
output, political rights, or property rights.
Estimation results are presented in columns (0) through (3) of Table
6 and, with the associated implied elasticities at mean values of relevant
variables in columns (0a) through (3a).
Results here are disappointing. The signs of all variables but property
rights accordwithpriors: negativeimpact ofpolitical instability anduser cost
on investment, a positive impact of output and property rights; for political
instability, a dampening e¤ect emergingfrom output, and political rights, but
rising instability from rising crime, and improving property rights. However,
the …nding is of improving property rights raising political instability. More
importantly, the elasticities particularly on output in both the investment
and the instability vectors are implausibly large (approximately 20 and 15
respectively), as are the elasticities that attach to property rights in the
instability vector particularly, but also the investment relation. Finally, all
evidenceof any error correction for thepolitical instabilityrelationdissipates.
Findings are invarianttothespeci…cation, or the weakexogeneity assumption
being made.
Evidence from neither the strong nor the weak tests of the potential
determinants of instability is thus compelling. In the weak test, evidence in
favour of an equilibrium mechanism being present in the data itself breaks
down.
For this reason we undertake a last, mixed test of the three mechanisms
underlying the determination of political instability. In this we proceed by
estimating under the overidentifying restrictions on (5.4) of ¯25 = ¯27 = 0
in a base model, ¯25 = ¯27 = ®21 = ®22 = 0 for the modernization case,
¯25 = ¯27 = ®71 = ®72 = 0 under political primacy, and ¯25 = ¯27 =
®61 = ®62 = 0 for the case of institutional/property rights primacy. The
implication is of an exclusion of political rights as a long run forcing variable
in the relationships being estimated. Motivation for the speci…cation comes
from Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz (2001b), who present econometric evidence
suggesting that while property rights and political instability were relevantThe Political Economy of Institutions 16
to capital accumulation in South Africa, political rights were an outcome
variable of output, not an exogenous variable driving either investment or
growth. The mixed test re‡ects this …nding by excludingpolitical rights from
the long run speci…cations as a RHS variable, though it remains present as
an outcome variable in the long run levels speci…cation, as well as in the
short run dynamics of the system.26
Estimation results for the mixed test are reported in Table 7, with the
associated implied elasticities at relevant variable mean values reported in
Table 8.
The core implication to emerge from the mixed test, is that the implau-
sibly large elasticities found under the weak and some strong test speci…-
cations disappear, as soon as the weak exogeneity restriction of the insti-
tutional/property rights primacy or the modernization hypothesis cases are
imposed. Only for the base model (without exogeneity restrictions - see
columns (1) of Tables 7 and 8) or for the political primacy cases (political
rights exogeneity restriction - see columns (4) of Tables 7 and 8) do implau-
sibly large elasticities on output reappear.
For the modernization case (GDP exogeneity restriction - see columns
(2) of Tables 7 and 8), while the output elasticity in the investment relation
is now more plausible (approximately 8.5), the instability relationship e¤ec-
tively dissipates. While statistically coherent, it loses all economic power, in
the sense that all three explanatory variables have virtually no meaningful
impact on political instability. The implication in our context would be that
while structural determinants of political instability could be identi…ed, the
changes in output, crime rates and property rights would have to vary very
substantially indeed, before any discernible e¤ect on instability would be reg-
istered. Moreover, the observed declines in the political instability measure
during the 1990’s for South Africa would simply not be attributable to the
identi…ed explanatory variables of this speci…cation. The problem with the
modernization speci…cation therefore is that it fails in its ability to provide
explanatory power over crucial test periods of South African institutional
development.
Both the political primacy case, as well as the modernization case fail
26We alsowidely tested the alternative speci…cation in which only politicalrights appears
in the instability relationship, while property rights are excluded. The implausibly large
elasticities of the weak test uniformly remain present in allthese speci…cations, with output
elasticities of approximately 20 in the investment relation, and 10-20 in the instability
relationship. Full results available from the authors on request.The Political Economy of Institutions 17
in crucial dimensions, therefore. Political primacy due to an absence of ex-
planatory power. Modernization due to implausibly large impacts attributed
to the explanatory variables.
The speci…cationwhichattributes primacy toinstitutions/property rights,
is the only one to perform satisfactorily.
The speci…cation which tests for the primacy of property rights returns
plausible elasticities (recall that the relationship between output and invest-
ment is that between stock and ‡ow - hence an elasticity of approximately 6
is not entirely implausible), signs of association that accord with priors, and
error correction speci…cations that con…rm the presence of error correction.
Results are reported in columns (3) of Tables 7 and 8. What is more, the
speci…cation which renders property rights weakly exogenous, is robust to
additional exogeneity restrictions being imposed on either output or political
rights - see for instance columns (5) and (6) of Tables7 and 8).
On this speci…cation we …nd standard results for the investment function.
Output growth acts as a positive trigger for investment ‡ows (elasticity of
6), the user cost of capita is an investment deterrent (elasticity of 0.5), while
improving property rights raise investment expenditure (elasticity of 3.2).
Perhaps the core …nding of this study is that the North hypothesis of the
primacy of institutions, and property rights in particular, …nds the strongest
support from our empirical investigation of the determinants of political in-
stability in South Africa. Property rights prove to be important not only
in dampening political instability (elasticity of 2.5), but in stimulating in-
vestment (elasticity of 3.2). But note that the support for the primacy of
property rights comes inweak form, inthe sense that risingoutput also serves
to impact on instability. Rising output serves to dampen instability (elas-
ticity of approximately 3), and rising crime rates have an additional strong
impact on instability (elasticity of approximately 4). Primacy of the prop-
erty rights dimension emerges in the weak exogeneity format only, not in the
sense that they constitute the sole determinant of instability.
We represent the core …ndings in schematic form in Figure 1.
8 Conclusion
The empirical results of this paper support the …ndings of previous research
in one important respect. We have con…rmed that political instability does
impact on the aggregate investment rate of South Africa. There is alsoThe Political Economy of Institutions 18
strong support suggesting that investment is positively related to GDP, and
negatively to the user cost of capital.
The important extension of this paper has been a more complete ex-
ploration of the role of property rights in investment, and the institutional
underpinnings of physical capital accumulation.
Previous examinations of investment under uncertainty only established
the importance of political instability to the investment relationship. In this
paper we investigated three potentially competing explanations of political
instability itself. Modernization theory attributes political instability to the
disruption of traditional institutional structures due to economic develop-
ment. An alternative attributes the primary driver of political instability to
the inconsistency and incoherence of the principles that govern a political
order. The …nal explanatory framework attributes primacy to the evolu-
tion of property rights speci…cally, and the broader institutional framework
associated with the property rights structure of a society.
Our empirical results …nd support for both the modernization process,
and the primacy of property rights, but relatively little support for the polit-
ical primacy explanation. Property rights prove to be important not only in
dampening political instability, but in stimulating investment. But property
rights are not the only determinant of political instability. Both output and
crime rates have an impact on instability. Primacy of the property rights
dimension emerges in the weak exogeneity format only, not in the sense that
they constitute the sole determinant of instability.
The paper provides important insights into the webs of association be-
tween institutions and investment rates. It highlights the signi…cance of
getting institutions right to ensure that uncertainty is kept to a minimum
by providing a, predictable long term environment. Stability at a systemic
level appears crucial if investment rates are to rise in South Africa and this
paper demonstrates that stability in turn is driven by a sound institutional
environment that has multiple dimensions.The Political Economy of Institutions 19
9 Appendix A: Data, Variables and Data Sources
INVRAT - (It) - the net change in …xed capital stock (of machinery and
capital equipment) is used as our measure of investment in South Africa.
LNRGDP - (Yt) - the log of real gross domestic product is used as the
proxy for the expected return on capital. We expect a positive association
with the investment rate.
INSTAB - (INSTt) - the logged index of political instability - formulated
as a weigthed average of eleven measures of political repression and oppo-
sition. It covers the period 1935 to 1997. Source: Fedderke, De Kadt and
Luiz, (2001a).
USER - (UCt) - the user cost of capital is a proxy for the marginal cost
of capital. It has been calculated as the weighted average of the rate of
depreciation, the corporate tax rate and the short term interest rate.
PROPRIGHT- (PROPt) - the log of property rights captures the formal
property rights of the South African legal framework. The index re‡ects the
freedom to own property, operate businesses and trade internationally etc
without undue regulation. Source: Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz, (2001a).
POLRIGHT - (POLt) - the log of political rights is a subjective index
created by Fedderke, de Kadt and Luiz (2001a) and measures political free-
dom a¤orded by the government at any point in time. Source: Fedderke, De
Kadt and Luiz, (2001a).
CRIMPOP - (CRt) - the number of criminal cases prosecuted and is a
measure that indicates the number of criminal cases per unit of population.
Source: Fedderke, De Kadt and Luiz, (2001a).
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Cost of capital  -    -  -  - 
Real interest rate    -       
Price non traded capital    -       
Wage  elasticity  -       
Output (expected future demand)  +    +  +  + 
Index of opportunity  +         
Rate of return on capital      +     
Macroeconomic  instability  -       
Political and economic uncertainty    -  -  -  - 
Demand  uncertainty    -    
Real cost of labour    +  +     
Enrolment rate (human capital)        +   
Government consumption        -   
Private credit extension          + 
Equity market liquidity (Value added ratio)          + 

































Table 2: The Three Conceptions of Political Instability in the Context of an Investment Model 
Row: Modernization   
Theory 
Primacy of the Political  Primacy of 
 Institutions:  
property rights 
1. 
Investment:  () ,, , I fY u c I N S TP R O P =   ( ) ,, , I fY u c I N S TP R O P =   () ,, , I fY u c I N S TP R O P =  
2. 
Strong Test  () INST g Y =   ( ) INST h POL =   () INST m PROP =  
3. 


















































 Table 3 - Reported Augmented Dickey-Fuller test results 
 
Variable ~I(0)  ~I(1)  Critical  Value 
INVRAT -1.38  -5.59*  -2.92 
LNRGDP -2.92  -3.86*  -2.92 
USER -1.93  -5.59*  -3.52 
LNINSTAB -3.34  -7.68*  -3.51 
CRIMPOP -2.65  -6.40*  -3.52 
LNPROP 1.64  -6.65*  -2.94 
LNPOL -0.68  -3.98*  -2.94 








































Table 4 - Maximal eigenvalue and trace statistics; VAR=3 
 








r=0 r=1  75.68  *  49.320 237.06* 147.270 
r≤1 r=2  63.16*  43.610 161.37* 115.850 
r≤2 r=3  28.70  37.860  98.21*  87.170 
r≤3 r=4  23.31  31.790  69.51*  63.000 
r≤4 r=5  21.52  25.420  46.20*  42.340 
r≤5  r=6  16.76 19.220 24.68 25.770 
r≤6  r=7  7.92 12.390 7.92 12.390 

























































  CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 
 INVRAT  INSTAB  INVRAT  INSTAB  INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB 
              
INVRAT  1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00             
INSTAB  3.62e-
05 
1.00  0.382 †  1.00 †  1.13e-
05 
1.00  0.74  6.52  0.23  
LNRGDP  -1.947  -2445   .8
0.00 
-5.654 0.00 -1.993 0.00  -8.85  -0.54  -25.69   -9.05  
CRIMPOP  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00        
USER  0.003 0.00  0.014 0.00 0.003 0.00  0.15  0.78  0.17  
POLRIGHT  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.030 0.00  0.00       0.41    
PROPRIGHT  -0.021 0.00  -0.045  0.00  -0.038  6649.3  -4.31  -9.22  -7.76  66.58 
TREND  0.098 0.00  0.258  0.00  0.103  0.00        
                












       















      























































  CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 
  INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB 
INVRAT  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.00  1.00  0.00          
INSTAB  0.031  1.00  0.039  1.00  0.033 †  1.00 †  2.55e-05  1.00  0.53    0.67    0.57     0.52   
LNRGDP  -4.699 56.126 -4.537 44.613 -5.264 56.812 -4.213 60652 -21.35  14.94  -20.62  11.87  -23.92  15.12  -19.14  13.46 
CRIMPOP  0.00 -292.07 0.00 -244.60 0.00 -297.85 0.00  -3.2e+05    -4.01    -3.36      -4.09    -3.65 
USER  0.022 0.00  0.023 0.00 0.025 0.00 0.021 0.00  1.22  1.28   1.37      1.13  
POLRIGHT  0.00 0.718 0.00 0.576 0.00 0.734 0.00  768.55    9.74    7.82      9.96    8.69 
PROPRIGHT  -0.057 -1.182 -0.057 -0.999 -0.072 -1.365 -0.046  -1135.6  -11.63 -14.20 -11.64 -12.00  -14.77 -16.40  -9.38  -11.37 
TREND  0.248 0.00  0.238  0.00  0.277  0.00  0.223  0.00          
                    
















         































GDP & PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
EXOGENOUS 
  CV1  CV2  CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 
 INVRAT  INSTAB  INVRAT  INSTAB  INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB 
INVRAT  1.00  0.00  1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
INSTAB  2.716e-05 1.00 -4.57e-05  1.00  1.05e-05  1.00 1.14e-
005 
1.00 9.7e-06 1.00  8.19e-06  1.00 
LNRGDP  -5.177  13813  -1.864  8.73e-07  -1.356 13225  -5.9998 3336  -1.37  10185  -0.73  13403 
CRIMPOP  0.00 -4.354e+05 0.00  -8.56e-
07 
0.00  -4.14e+05  0.00  -2.44e+05  0.00 -4e+05 0.00  -4.4e+05 
USER  0.016  0.00  -0.004 0.00 0.009 0.00 0.011 0.00 0.008 0.00  -0.0006  0.00 
POLRIGHT  0.00  0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
PROPRIGHT  -0.077  426.38  -0.021  0.001  -0.016 248.65 -0.069 -461.13 -0.018 -358.68 -0.005 447.35 
TREND  0.270  0.00  0.094 0.00 0.071 0.00 0.319 0.00 0.072 0.00 0.036 0.00 
                     








































































  CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 CV1 CV2 
  INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB INVRAT INSTAB 
INVRAT              
INSTAB  0.56  -0.94     0.21  0.23    0.20    0.17  
LNRGDP  -23.52 3.07  -8.47  1.94E-
10 
-6.16 2.93  -27.26  0.74 -6.24 2.26 -3.31 2.97 
CRIMPOP   -4.98   -9.80E-
12 
 -4.74  -2.80  -4.58  -5.00 
USER  0.90  -0.21  0.47  0.59  0.44  -0.03  
POLRIGHT              
PROPRIGHT  -15.80 4.27  -4.31  8.30E-
06 



















 Figure 1: Representation of the relationships of Property 
Rights Model
I/Y
Political
Instability -0.21
Y
Crime
Property 
Rights User Cost
-2.49 -0.47
4.74
6.16 -2.93
3.18
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 